peratives that led the liberal government of the time to sponsor the legislation. Evidence of 'sweating' -the exploitation of women (many of them outworkers) and child labour in the clothing industry -prompted widespread community con cern. And die consequences of die 1890 Maridme Strike were of sufficient magni tude and concern to suggest that the orderly conduct of labour reladons might ap propriately be prosecuted by way of public policy. In short, labour legisladon was jusdfied by clear evidence of market failure, and informed by die dual imperatives of equity in outcomes and order in process. Moreover, in respect of the former imperadve, market failure was most evident in what we would now refer to as the secondary labour market.
The evidence that Rod Lingard (1996) cites in his recent note in Agendasurvey results on die preferences of employers and employees, and on the out comes of bargaining under the ECA -should not obscure the fundamental issue dial separates supporters and opponents of radical labour-market liberalisation. That issue goes to die heart of the nature of die labour market. Those of a libertar ian persuasion argue diat 'It is a common delusion to treat people's choice to sell their labour as fundamentally different from other economic choices diey might take' (Garvey, 1994:11) . In stark contrast, odiers have suggested that
The heart of the problem is dial die labour market cannot be visualised as a market like any odier, widi unions blocking prices from doing dieir proper job of equalising die supply and die demand for labour. Human beings are not tradeable commodities. As . . . Robert Solow argues, die dieoretical categories diat might apply to analysing trade in chocolate bars, fish or computers cannot be extended to labour because we have to confront die issues of fairness, morale and human motivation diat permeate human ac tion. (Hutton, 1995:98-9) Much empirical evidence exists relating to die impact of die ECA. But identify ing cause and effect, particularly widi regard to die macroeconomic impacts of the ECA, is problematic, particularly in view of the absence of a counter-factual. Moreover, die impact of die ECA is not easily separated from odier policy changes. Legislating for an effective reduction in union influence, increased individual con tracting at die lower end of die market, and a tightening of benefit eligibility and re ductions in entidements will tend to result in die expected shifts in supply and price. That has demonstrably been die case in New Zealand, and die ECA has been only part of die story.
Bargaining Outcomes
Lingard's use of evidence is at times selective, and some of his conclusions appear not to be supported by any evidence at all.
Lingard cites approvingly research undertaken by die New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) on the impact of die ECA, but his reporting of the research is somewhat selective. O f the employers surveyed by the NZIER, 42.6 per cent indicated that they had reduced overtime rates, and 38.8 per cent had reduced other allowances and/or penal rates. Some 40 per cent of employers surveyed re ported no change in ordinary-time wage rates in the period from the passage of the ECA to December 1995 (Savage, 1996) .
There is absolutely no evidence to support Lingard's assertion that those cov ered under collective contracts have made relatively smaller 'gains' than those em ployed on individual contracts. Statistics New Zealand simply has no way of identi fying the type of contract coverage in computing wage/income changes. W hat we do know is that there is evidence of inequality in bargaining outcomes: in the past year, 46 per cent of wage rates have not changed, but a quarter have increased by more than 3 per cent.
W e also have evidence on the pattern of collective-contract coverage by size of enterprise and by sector. Approximately 23 per cent of workers are covered by collective employment contracts, but only 16 per cent of those workers are under contracts covering fewer than 100 workers. This creates a less than 3 per cent chance that a worker in a small (under 100) workplace will be covered by a collec tive employment contract; yet 75 per cent of workers are in that situahon (NZCTU, 1996) . A recent review of the data on contract coverage concludes with the obser vation that 'the right to collective representation in setting conditions of employ ment has nothing to do with democracy or free choice. It is simply a factor of scale of employment' (NZCTU, 1996:63) .
W hat about the much vaunted productivity dividend? The NZIER reports that 'aggregate data implies that productivity performance in recent years has been below average ' (1996:11) , and die OECD has noted tiiat, 'tiiere is not much evidence at die macroeconomic level . . . diat die ECA has led to increased flexibility and im provements in productivity ' (cited in NZCTU, 1996:12) .
Lingard fails to report evidence of die impact of the ECA on a labour market diat is segmented by gender. In May 1996, Douglas Myers, Chairman of die New Zealand Business Roundtable, suggested that die ECA had been good for women, and argued diat 'W om en's interests rarely got a fair hearing in male-dominated trade unions committed to a 40 hour week; die extra flexibility in working hours and growdi in part-time jobs have been of great advantage for them' (Myers, 1996) . In fact, research on bargaining outcomes suggests that, under die ECA, women are less likely dian men to be employed on contracts diat contain penalty rates of pay. Women are disadvantaged in that die sectors in which diey are most commonly employed are exaedy those sectors where penalty rates, lor working at weekends and odier hours diat have traditionally been deemed sufliciendy anti-social to attract a premium rate of pay, have been eliminated. (Hammond & Harbridge, 1995:372) The same audiors suggested, prior to die introduction of die Australian govern ment's Workplace Relations Bill, diat decentralisation of bargaining in Australian workplaces risked a worsening of the 'structural inequalities of industry segmenta tion' (Hammond & Harbridge, 1995:374) .
Employee Representation
Lingard notes that there has been a decline in levels of union representation, and offers the observation that this is part of a 'steady and relentless' (p. 495) and 'continuing decline ' (p. 496) . That there has been a decline is without question. That the EC A has largely contributed to the decline is likewise not in dispute. But what it is about the ECA that has prompted this decline is an issue on which there is a greater range of views than Iingard's assessment might suggest. And Lingard's commentary, while selective, attests to this by suggesting, variously, that the decline is a function of a 'free and contestable labour market', and that a decline in unioni sation in the services sector may have something to do with the fact that, for unions, this is a 'difficult' sector in which to organise (p. 496).
The above observations on the pattern of collective bargaining are clearly ap posite in this regard. There is simply no evidence to support the suggestion that unions are losing market share: quite the opposite. A recent review of the pattern of representation (for 3,216 contracts covering 403,000 employees) suggests that Non-traditional unions (in-house unions or bargaining agents) have not de veloped as an important force. . . They continue to represent just 2 per cent of employees in our sample. Traditional unions have maintained their market share representing some 89 per cent of employees. (Harbridge, Crawford & Kicly, 1996: 10)
The ECA and ILO Conventions
The ECA fails to meet the tests of the relevant ILO Conventions. Reviewing die Final Report of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, which undertook a Direct Contact Mission to examine the impact of the ECA, Haworth and Hughes (1995:154) report that die ILO continues to entertain grave concerns about the operation of the ECA on two counts. First, the status of individual bargaining given by the ECA is in direct contradiction to ILO principles of collective bargaining and, by extension, to the parallel principles of tripartism. In the discourse of tiie ILO, this criticism remains a fundamental issue putting the ECA at odds with ILO practice. In a host of contexts, not only that of Convention 98, tiie ILO has established precedence for collective bargaining in labour relations and tiie ECA contradicts this precedence.
It is interesting to note that Australia's Workplace Relations Bill may be incon sistent with ILO Conventions to which tiie Australian government is a signatory.
Conclusion
Advocates of die kinds of neoclassical policy prescriptions of which the ECA is an exemplar typically justify the need for radical liberalisation, in part at least, on the grounds that formal systems of conciliation and arbitration militated against the necessary degree of flexibility in process and outcomes. IJngard's conclusion paints a picture of a set of institutional arrangements in Australia, by implication under the ALP-ACTU Accord, corrupted by vested interests, characterised by statist control, creating distortions, and pricing individuals out of the labour market. This com mentary is not die place to contest Iingard's jaundiced assessment of those ar rangements. Suffice it to say that die recent course of Australian public policy and die emerging debate over die future policy trajectory deserves more dian the facile treatment diat Lingard offers.
Australia has a choice. The relevant issues do not revolve so much around whedier jobs can be produced by die kinds of supply-side reforms that the ECA and adjustments to welfare arrangements permit. Radier, they revolve around die kinds of jobs diat will be generated; whedier or not intemadonal compedtiveness is a funedon solely of die reladve price of labour; and die contribudon made by the quality of a nation's human capital.
